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Abstract—Watermarking and fingerprinting of relational databases are quite proficient for ownership protection, tamper proofing, and
proving data integrity. In past few years several such techniques have been proposed. A survey of almost all the work done, till date,
in these fields has been presented in this paper. The techniques have been classified on the basis of how and where they embed the
watermark. The analysis and comparison of these techniques on different merits has also been provided. In the end, this paper points
out the direction of future research in these fields.
Index Terms—Database watermarking, ownership protection, database security, tamper detection, data integrity, data usability.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The data is an important asset for its owner. Digital
data sharing is becoming an emerging trend both at the
personal and organization level. Information and com-
munication technology (ICT) systems generate and use
enormous amount of data that contains useful knowl-
edge which needs to be extracted by using different
data mining and warehousing techniques. In a col-
laborative environment, individuals and organizations
need to share their data using different resources. The
shared data must adhere to secrecy (for preventing
unauthorized disclosure of data), integrity (malicious
data modifications), and availability (error recovery) [1].
The digital data can be copied, altered and may be re-
distributed for different purposes, and this fact may
violate the copyrights of the data owner.
With an ever increase in sharing of data, the digital
technology faces the challenge of preventing piracy of
precious and sensitive data in different formats like text,
software, image, video, audio, spatial trajectory data [2],
[3], [4], [5], [6] to ensure that the data is used in an
authorized manner only. Only the relevant and necessary
data should be shared across private databases and the
shared data should also be right protected. To tackle this
situation, there is a need of an efficient right protection
mechanism for the digital data. In this context, issues
like ownership protection and illegitimate circulation
of digital content can be controlled by Digital Rights
Protection (DRP).
Cryptographic techniques usually do not associate the
cryptographic information with digital contents; there-
fore, cryptography cannot provide the ownership infor-
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mation [7]. Moreover, the cryptosystem (a suite consist-
ing of three algorithms: (i) a key generation algorithm;
(ii) an encryption algorithm; and (iii) a decryption al-
gorithm) does not provide any guaranteed mechanism
for tracing the redistribution and/or alteration of the
digital content. Consequently, they alone are not well
suited for DRP. Some techniques such as [8] can be used
for detecting and identifying the changes made in the
data – by organizing the indexing structure of stored
data. Digital watermarking, on the other hand, associates
permanent information with the digital contents. This
information can then be used to prove the ownership
of the digital content. Watermarking of digital data has
been quite widely used for right protection of digital
intellectual property (IP) [9]. A watermark is basically
a piece of secret information, which is inserted into a
specific location inside the digital data as a copyright
information.
Watermarking has – so far – found its application
in right protection of images, multimedia, natural lan-
guage text, softwares, semi-structured data like XML,
map information, relational databases, electronic medical
records (EMR), and Geographical Information Systems
(GIS) databases. Among these areas, relational databases
watermarking is a relatively fresh area but is of great im-
portance because outsourced databases need to be right
protected to stop its illegal (or unauthorized) use. The
watermarking of relational databases is different from
other data formats. As opposed to other data formats,
in database watermarking one has to deal with multiple
tuples simultaneously, the ordering of database tuples
does not matter, and a subset of the database is also
useable. Moreover, a database may contain attributes
with different data types like numeric, text, and discrete
data. So watermarking such data requires valid marks
for every data type.
A database watermarking scheme should be robust
against all kinds of malicious attacks that are launched
for deteriorating the watermark. The watermarking
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2scheme should also be imperceptible, which requires that
there should not be any apparent difference between
the original and the watermarked content. Furthermore,
the watermark should be such that it can be detected
using some secret parameters like secret key etc. A
good watermarking technique is also blind, that is, it
should not need the original data or watermark to
detect the watermark from the altered data. Moreover,
the embedded watermark should only be detectable by
the data owner. Furthermore, the watermark should not
deteriorate the original data and data usability should be
ensured during the process of watermark insertion. The
watermarking of databases should also take into account
such methods which ensure that the query results and
associated statistics should be preserved. If a watermark
has to be embedded multiple times, then the watermarks
should not affect each other.
A fragile watermark, which is affected even by mi-
nor malicious attacks, is also a requirement for tam-
per proofing and data integrity. Fragile watermarking
techniques are suitable for applications that require data
integrity and therefore fragile watermarks are usually be
vulnerable to even benign updates because he attacker
–Mallory– does not want to disturb the embedded water-
mark while trying to tamper the watermarked dataset.
Fingerprinting of relational databases is also similar to
watermarking with a major difference: in fingerprinting
a database is marked with a different watermark for
every different user of the fingerprinted database, while
in watermarking usually the same watermark is used
for all the users of the watermarked database. One
such technique is presented in [10]. The fingerprinting
techniques are used in the applications domains where
the data owner –Alice– wants to identify the guilty agent
who was responsible for the data leakage(the guilty
agent is represented as Mallory in such scenarios.).
To summarize, the three main type of watermark
techniques have different applications as:
• The robust watermarking techniques are suitable for
applications that require ownership protection.
• The fragile watermarking techniques serve the pur-
pose for data tamperproofing and data integrity
check.
• The fingerprinting techniques provide a mechanism
for identifying the guilty user whose data was com-
promised.
Arguably, the major requirement of watermarking
scheme – for ownership protection and fingerprinting
– is its robustness against malicious attacks. Therefore,
the data owner Alice1, would want to insert the most
possible robust watermark in the database. Alice has
two options to embed watermark into her data. She
can either modify the value of some selected bits of
the data, or embed watermark into the data statistics.
The later approach is more robust to malicious attacks
1. Throughout this document, we refer Alice(female) as the data
owner.
as the former can easily be attacked by simple data
manipulations, such as shifting of some least significant
bits (LSBs). Also, the embedding of watermark in large
number of tuples makes it more resilient. But Alice can
only insert the watermark bounded by the data usability
constraints. These usability constraints are application
dependent, hence every time Alice wants to watermark
her data, she has to define the usability constraints.
Once Alice has watermarked her data, she would make
it public or share (or sale) it to some party. The at-
tacker, Mallory2, would want to corrupt the embedded
watermark or even remove the watermark from the
watermarked data. Since the attacker has no access to
the original database; therefore, he might deteriorate
the usability of the data during these attacks. But it is
supposed that he can locate the watermark if he has
access to the secret parameters (such as a secret key). The
attacker can perform every type of manipulation on the
watermarked data because he has unrestricted access to
the watermarked data. He can attack the data using these
manipulations, so these manipulations define the type of
attack. After attacking the database Mallory yields a new
database.
Alice has to make her watermark robust against these
attacks so that they cannot affect the embedded water-
mark. These attacks can be broadly classified as:
• A1(Insertion attacks): Mallory may insert α new
records in the watermarked database.
• A2(Deletion attacks): Mallory may delete α records
from the watermarked database.
• A3(Alteration attacks): Mallory may alter α records
from the watermarked database.
• A4(Multifaceted attacks): Mallory may delete α
records, alter β records, and insert γ new records
to form a new database.
• A5(Additive (Re-watermarking) attacks): In such at-
tacks, Mallory inserts his own watermark in the
already marked database.
Similarly, for fragile watermarking technique, the ma-
jor requirement for the watermark is to be vulnerable
to even minor modifications of the dataset while also
fulfilling the additional requirements of characterization
and localization of attacks.
After the pioneer work by Agrawal et al. [11] the
problem of relational databases watermarking has been
addressed in several techniques, with each technique
having its own benefits, drawbacks, issues and lim-
itations. Some of these techniques are reversible (for
instance, [12], [13], [59]) while other are irreversible
(for instance, [15], [16], [17], [18]) depending upon the
nature of their intended applications. Similarly, some
techniques are meant for ownership protection (for in-
stance, [53], [19], and [21]) while others are designed
for data integrity and verification (for instance, [22] and
[23]). For database watermarking, usually bit strings [24],
2. Throughout this document, we refer Mallory (male) as the mali-
cious attacker.
3images [25], speech signals [26], character strings [27] are
used as a watermark.
In [28] Halder et al. presented a survey for classifi-
cation and comparison of some of these watermarking
techniques. We believe that a detailed survey of rela-
tional database watermarking techniques is an important
need in order to facilitate researchers to explore this area
of research by providing them access to state-of-the-art
research. This paper presents a comprehensive survey
of relational database watermarking and fingerprinting
techniques – developed to date – with the objective of
developing an understanding about: (1) how and where
the watermark is inserted; (2) their resilience against
malicious attacks; (3) the shortcomings of the existing
work. Moreover, the paper will also act as a reference
to provide pointers to latest research in this field. As a
result, it will enable researchers to design an effective
watermarking technique for their application domain.
We classify the existing work done into three broad
categories based on how and where the watermark is
inserted. We also present a comparison of major wa-
termarking techniques – belonging to the same classi-
fication hierarchy in our paper – so that a reader can
learn about their evolutionary history. For this purpose,
we short-listed only those papers for comparison which
were published in reputable computer science Confer-
ences and Journals3 and for brevity, we also did not
compare all of them.
For collecting the research articles related to relational
database watermarking, we have used the concept of
citation graph by making two way transitions: (1) the
first one is to select a pioneer paper and look at relevant
references in its list; and (2) use Google Scholar to
identify all articles (published after this article) that cite
it. As a result, we have short listed more than 100 papers.
The literature search was exhaustive and every effort is
made to include papers published in prestigious Journals
and Conferences.
We have organized the rest of the paper as follows.
We present the brief description of the related work in
Section 2. A generic framework of relational database
watermarking technique is given in Section 3 and a
comprehensive review and classification of watermark-
ing and fingerprinting techniques in Section 4 (for ease
of reference figure 1 shows the hierarchical structure
of review and classification of watermarking and fin-
gerprinting techniques). Then we give a comparison of
different classes of watermarking schemes and point out
the future directions in Section 5 and conclude in Section
6.
2 MOTIVATIONS AND RELATED WORK
The major motivation behind this work is to develop a
better understanding of the relational data watermarking
3. The list of computer science Confer-
ences and Journals ranking can be found at
http://academic.research.microsoft.com/?SearchDomain=2&entitytype=2
(link last accessed on April 04, 2016).
techniques for real world problems. Moreover, we are
also interested in the vulnerability of these techniques
against malicious attacks. We also analyze the process
of defining data usability constraints and their relevance
to relational data.
In [29], Sion et al. define some attacking scenarios
available for the attacker and suggest design choices to
increase watermark safety but they did not investigate
the attacker model in detail and also their objective was
not to present a comparison of watermarking techniques.
In [28], Halder et al. presented a classification and
comparison of some relational database watermarking
techniques. In [30], authors presented the idea of two
models regarding leakage of secret watermarking con-
tents. These models are based on different combination
of keys and databases. In [31], [32], and [33] the survey
of few selected database watermarking techniques has
been presented.
But the focus of these efforts are also not towards
comparing different watermarking techniques under dif-
ferent attack scenarios. On the other hand, the focus of
our work is to present the first (comprehensive) survey
by critically reviewing almost all relational database
watermarking techniques – presented so far – by: (1)
highlighting issues related to watermark embedding;
(2) investigating their robustness; (3) exploring their
applicability for real world problems; and (4) suggesting
the future directions of research.
3 A GENERIC FRAMEWORK FOR RELATIONAL
DATABASE WATERMARKING/ FINGERPRINTING
TECHNIQUES
The watermarking or fingerprinting technique needs to
meet certain common requirements, however, they do
still differ in many other aspects. This section entails
a brief description of these common requirements and
also highlights different decision choices among the
watermarking (and fingerprinting) techniques. The ad-
vantage of this description is two folds: (1) it provides
a generic unified reference framework for describing
and comparing different watermarking and fingerprint-
ing techniques; (2) this framework can also be used as
a guideline for developing meta-techniques for water-
marking relational data. It consists of three modules
and a several submodules that can be used to design
and implement a watermarking technique. The top level
modules include: (1) watermark encoding; (2) attacker
channel; and (3) watermark decoding. The framework
in figure 2 depicts the characteristics of the different
modules and their inter-module and intra-module col-
laborations. The functionality and characteristic of each
module and its subsequent components is given in the
next subsection.
3.1 Watermark Encoding
The main purpose of this module is embedding own-
ership information in the dataset. This module may
4Fig. 1. Diagram for depicting hierarchical structure of review and classification of watermarking and fingerprinting
techniques.
include: (1) preprocessing steps like data partitioning,
defining secret parameters etc.; (2) strategies to select
data for watermarking while using an optimization strat-
egy to ensure best watermark encoding; (3) defining
usability constraints to ensure quality of data during
watermark embedding; (4) embedding watermark sub-
ject to usability constraints; (5) computing a number of
parameters for use in watermark decoding stage, and
finally (6) generating the watermarked dataset for deliv-
ering it to the intended recipients. The brief description
of each submodule is given in the following.
Preprocessing. The optional preprocessing steps may
involve conversion of watermark information (images,
owner name etc.) to bit strings. The data is also usually
divided into logical groups using a particular given
criterion. Data partitioning is performed using secret
parameters to ensure that only the data owner knows
the information about the data partitioning.
Strategies. Strategies for selecting attribute(s), tuple(s),
watermark optimization, and watermark embedding
are different components of this sub-module. It is not
mandatory that a watermarking technique will utilize
all of the above-mentioned strategies.
Usability. Usability constraints are defined by the data
owner to identify bandwidth for watermarking. The
sole purpose of this sub-module is to ensure that the
watermarked data remains usable.
Watermark embedding. This sub-module embeds the
watermark in accordance with the encoding strategies
and data usability. The watermark embedding has to
cater a number of challenges by answering questions like
whether: (1) an inserted watermark brings distortions in
the original data; (2) an inserted watermark is fragile
(watermark is corrupted after even minor malicious
attacks), semi-fragile(watermark may tolerate minor ma-
licious attacks, but cannot tolerate major attacks), or
robust against attacks (can tolerate malicious attacks to a
certain level); (3) the inserted watermark is reversible or
irreversible (that is original data may or not be recovered
after watermark decoding); (4) an inserted watermark is
perceptible or imperceptible (but it is desired that rela-
tional database watermarking should be imperceptible).
Decoding parameters
Some of the parameters of watermark embedding
are usually required for watermark decoding, that are
calculated and saved by this submodule.
Watermarked dataset
The main output of watermark encoding module is
a watermarked dataset that subsequently delivered to
intended recipients.
3.2 Attacker Channel
An attacker – Mallory – can launch a number of ma-
licious attacks on the watermarked data. The attacker
channel module refers to all such possible attacks. The
5Fig. 2. Diagram for depicting different components of a watermarking technique.
6attacks can modify some contents of the data with an aim
to disturb the embedded watermark. The description of
this module has already been given in Section 1.
3.3 Watermark Decoding
This module is used to decode the embedded watermark
from the suspicious data. Usually, it involves: (1) some
preprocessing steps for dataset partitioning (if it was
performed during watermark embedding); (2) decoding
strategies for recovering watermark; (3) decoding steps
for marked attribute(s), marked tuple(s), and marked
bit identification; (4) error correction and recovery steps;
and (5) recovery of original data (for reversible water-
marking techniques only). The brief description of each
component of this module is as follows.
Preprocessing. If dataset partitioning was performed
during watermark encoding, the same steps are repeated
to generate data partitions.
Decoding Strategies. The watermark decoding strate-
gies include: (1) blindness of watermark decoding al-
gorithm – a blind decoding algorithm does not require
any part of original data or embedded watermark; but
semi blind decoding usually requires the embedded
watermark during decoding; (2) the watermark decoding
may be probabilistic or deterministic in nature; and (3)
watermark detection may be public or private depend-
ing on the security requirements.
Decoding steps. The marked attribute(s) and tuple(s)
are identified and watermark bits are decoded by this
submodule.
Post processing. The main responsibility of this sub-
module is to employ error correction mechanism (if
used) on the decoded watermark bits, and convert these
bits into the watermark information that was embedded
as the watermark (ownership information).
Recovered dataset. After watermark decoding the
original data may be recovered by reversible watermark-
ing techniques only.
4 WATERMARKING/FINGERPRINTING
TECHNIQUES CLASSIFICATION
Figure 3 is used to provide a basis for classification of
watermarking and fingerprinting techniques. In this fig-
ure the blocks containing label ”Watermark Information”
and ”Watermark Embedding Method” are used to define
different classes and their hierarchies. In this paper,
we classify the watermarking/fingerprinting techniques
into three broad categories based upon these two blocks.
They are:
• Bit-resetting techniques(BRT). In these techniques,
selected bits (mostly LSBs) are reset by following
a systematic process.
• Data statistics-modifying techniques(DSMT): Data
statistics such as mean, variance, distribution are
used to embed watermark in these techniques.
• Constrained data content-modifying tech-
niques(CDCMT). These techniques are based
on modifying the contents of the data, for example,
techniques based on the ordering of the tuples(such
as in [34]), insertion of extra spaces in attribute
values (such as in [35]) such that watermarked
data still remains useful. We also place the zero-
watermarking techniques (like [36]) under this
category.
Now we give a review of techniques that belong to these
top level techniques.
4.1 Bit-resetting techniques
We further classify such techniques into three categories:
• Bit pattern based bit-resetting techniques(BPBBRT):
In such techniques a bit pattern is used as a wa-
termark and embedded in the selected bits of the
data.
• Image based bit-resetting techniques(IBBRT): Image
is used as a watermark, for embedding in the se-
lected bits of the data, in such techniques.
• Bit-resetting fingerprinting techniques(BRFT): These
techniques employ fingerprinting phenomenon for
marking selected bits of the relational databases.
4.1.1 Bit pattern based bit-resetting techniques
4.1.1.1 BPBBRT with no specific watermark infor-
mation: In [11] Agrawal and Kiernan proposed a pio-
neering work of watermarking relational databases. A
parameter γ is used to compute the fraction of tuples
to be watermarked. In watermark embedding phase, a
tuple is selected for watermarking if the hash value of
its primary key modulo γ is equal to zero. In the next
step, an attribute and the bit position to be watermarked
is selected. A watermark bit is embedded in a tuple by
computing a hash value after applying a hash function
on primary key and a secret key. If this hash value is
even, jth LSB of the attribute values is set to 0; otherwise,
it is set to 1. The watermark detection algorithm starts
by identifying marked tuples, the marked attribute and
marked bit. This bit is matched with the embedded bit
and a threshold for matching bit count is computed.
If the match count is greater than or equal to this
threshold, watermark detection is said to be successful.
To extend this work, Agrawal et al. in [37], [2] used a
pseudo-random sequence generator to select tuples for
watermarking with a user specified gap parameter. The
authors did not use any mechanism for data usability af-
ter watermark embedding and used one bit watermark.
As a result, such techniques are vulnerable to simple
attacks. For instance, shifting of only one bit results in
deletion of watermark bits without a significant loss of
data usability. As a result, such techniques are not well-
suited for datasets which can tolerate changes in the LSB
positions. A number of recent techniques like [38], [39],
[40], [41], [42], [43], [44], [45] extend the work of [11] and
embed multi-bit watermark in selected LSBs; while, [46]
embeds watermark in third most significant bit (MSB) of
7Fig. 3. The building block for classification of watermarking techniques.
the numeric attribute. Similarly, in [51] the candidate bit
for watermarking is computed.
The watermarking techniques in [47] and [48] pro-
vided mechanism for providing ownership protection
for categorical data. The tuples ”fit” for watermarking
are selected by using a message authentication code
(MAC) which also takes a secret key k1 as an input
parameter. In the next step, a secret value for a cate-
gorical attribute in ”fit” tuples is generated and its LSB
is set to a value based on securely computed position.
This position is computed by another secret key k2. In
decoding phase, the ”fit” tuples from the watermarked
data are again computed using the same procedure as in
the watermark encoding phase. Watermark bits are then
decoded by setting wm data[msb(H(Tj(K), k2), b(Ne ))] =
t&1; where wmdata is watermarked table, Tj denotes
the jth tuple, K is the primary key, N is the mapping
of categorical data into bit strings, e determines the
tuples considered for watermarking, and t represents a
bit value. An error correction code (e.g., majority voting)
is also applied to eliminate the watermark decoding er-
rors. Though these are first major contributions towards
watermarking of categorical attributes but these tech-
niques are not suited for sensitive categorical data (e.g.
medical data) where changing the value of a categorical
attribute may lead to incorrect information regarding
an important entity. Moreover, if data is updated, the
watermark may be disturbed specially if a query alters
a large number of tuples. For numeric data, Cui et al. in
[55] modified the technique of [48].
In [49], a unique id is calculated for each tuple of the
table using a hash function. The next step is to partition
the data into p partitions with each partition having the
same number of records and then mark them subject
to usability constraints. The usability constraints include
statistical measurement constraints, semantic constraints
and structural constraints. The authors use mean and
variance of the data as statistical usability constraints
while the semantic and structural constraints are speci-
fied by SQL statements. If these constraints are violated
for any selected tuple, that tuple is excluded during wa-
termark detection phase to improve watermark decoding
accuracy. In watermark decoding stage, the tuples’s ids
are again computed using the same hash function and
data is partitioned. The bits are detected from each par-
tition probabilistically and the majority voting is used as
error correction mechanism. The technique suffers from
synchronization errors due to insertion and deletion of
new tuples because ids of tuples forming the partition
boundaries will no longer remain the same as during the
watermark encoding stage.
In [50], Bertino et al. proposed a hierarchical water-
marking for outsourced medical data. They use the sim-
ilar approach for watermarking as in [48] after binning
the medical data and embed the watermark in different
hierarchies. The hierarchies are defined with the help of
user roles. Generalization (trees)nodes are used to depict
these hierarchies.
In a fragile watermarking technique proposed in [52],
watermark embedding is done in such a way that it
forms a grid – which aids in identifying modifications
made to the watermarked database relation. During
watermark decoding stage, tuples are again grouped and
two verification vectors are formed for each group to
detect the two embedded watermarks. These two vectors
are also used to identify any modifications made to the
watermarked data.
In [56] Cui et al. proposed a watermarking technique
using combination of private key and public key. A
trusted third party IPR is informed about the public
key and the data owner is the only one who knows
the secret private key. In watermark insertion phase,
a mixed code is formed using the public key and the
private key. For watermark embedding, the appropriate
bit position is determined using the hash function and
the LSB of the attribute is marked. During watermark
decoding, the mixed code is computed again and the
majority voting scheme is applied to correctly locate the
marked bits. Finally, a map transformation is used to
decode the embedded watermark.
Wang et al. [57] applied v different watermarking
schemes on a database relation R as a preprocessing step
and then used the best one for watermark embedding. A
scheme is selected on the basis of its impact on the data
– the lower impact is preferred in the objective function.
Meng et al. [58] used genetic algorithm (GA) for
8generation of watermark. The chromosome is a bit string
of zeros and ones. The best chromosome is used as
a watermark. The watermark encoding and decoding
algorithm is same as proposed in [55].
A shadowed watermark based technique was pro-
posed in [60] by Xian et al. The data is watermarked
with a secret watermark key and a secret shadowed key
which is different for every data user. A trusted water-
mark server (TWS) watermarks the data and assigns the
shadowed key to the data user. When illegal data leakage
is detected, the shadowed key of the data user is used
to identify the actual source of data leakage; as a result,
the innocent user is not falsely accused of data leakage.
Although this techniques tends to protect an innocent
user but it also suffers from the same shortcomings as
suffered by the technique presented in [2].
Table 1 shows the summary and a comparison of
well known BPBBRTs with no specific watermark infor-
mation. This table compares different techniques based
on certain parameters depicted in Figure 2. Note that
the following nomenclature has been used in tables 1
through 12.
Column 1: Sch. provides a reference to a watermark-
ing technique.
Column 2: MAT refers to marked attribute data type.
This column can have values: All (all data types), N
(numeric data), C (categorical data), and AN (alpha-
numeric data).
Column 3: ASM is acronym for attribute selection
method and refers to the procedure of selecting at-
tribute(s) for watermarking. This column can have val-
ues: Arbitrary (attribute(s) for watermarking is/are ar-
bitrarily chosen by data owner), Weighted (based on
weights of attribute(s) weight), PRSG based (pseudo-
random sequence generator (PRSG) based), All (all at-
tributes are selected for watermarking), SHF based (se-
cure hash function (SHF) based), Property (based on
some particular properties of attribute), information gain
(IG) based, mutual information (MI) based, and Index
based (database Index based).
Column 4: TSM stands for tuple selection method
and refers to the procedure of selecting tuple(s) for
watermarking. This column can have values: Ar-
birary (tuple(s) for watermarking is/are arbitrarily cho-
sen), PRSG based (pseudo-random sequence generator
(PRSG) based), All (all tuples are selected for watermark-
ing), SHF based (secure hash function (SHF) based), and
Index based (Database Index based).
Column 5(for robust techniques): GL is granularity
level and refers to the basic unit where the watermark
is embedded. This column can have values: Bit (bit
level), Value (attribute value), Tuple (tuple level), Table
(database table level), and Index (database index level).
Column 5(for fragile techniques): Loc. refers to local-
ization levels (if any) to which a fragile technique is able
to locate the tempered data. This column can have val-
ues: Group (referring to a data block or partition level),
Tuple(record level), , and - (referring to the fact that
the technique is not able to localize the data tempering
attacks).
Column 6: DMB shows whether a decoding method is
blind or not. This column can have values: Blind, Semi-
blind, and Not blind (original data is required during
watermark decoding).
Column 7: ECM is abbreviation of error correction
mechanism and refers to error correction mechanism
adapted by the watermark decoding scheme. This col-
umn can have values: - (no error detection mechanism
is used by the decoding scheme), Voting (the majority
voting scheme is used for error detection), CRC (the
cyclic redundancy check is used as an error detection
mechanism), and EPC (the even parity check is used as
an error detection mechanism).
Column 8: Dep. refers to dependencies (if any) of the
watermark decoding scheme for successful watermark
decoding. This column can have values:
• PK: The successful watermark decoding depends on
primary key,
• Order: The successful watermark decoding depends
on the order of tuples in the watermarked database,
if the order of tuples is changed then the watermark
decoding accuracy may decrease,
• Value: The successful watermark decoding depends
on the watermarked attribute(s) value, if the value
of the attribute(s) is changed then the watermark
decoding accuracy may decrease,
• Markers: The successful watermark decoding de-
pends on special marker tuples which are used to
identify the boundaries of data partitions in the wa-
termarked database, if the position of these marker
tuples is changed then the watermark decoding
accuracy may decrease,
• Unique Column: The successful watermark decod-
ing depends on unique identifying column(s), if
the value of the unique identifying column(s) is
changed then the watermark decoding accuracy
may decrease.
• Information gain (IG): The successful watermark
decoding depends on information gain of the at-
tributes, if the value of the information gain of
attributes is changed then the watermark decoding
accuracy may decrease.
Column 9: Dist. is used for to show distortions intro-
duced by watermark embedding scheme. This column
can have values: Yes (the watermark embedding results
in distortions in original data), and No (the watermark
embedding does not introduce distortions in original
data).
Column 10: Opti. refers to any optimization strategy
used in the proposed technique. This column can have
values: Yes, and No.
Column 11 (for robust techniques): Rev. refers to the
fact that whether the proposed technique is reversible or
not. This column can have values: Yes(reversible), and
No(irreversible).
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the fact that whether the proposed fragile technique is
able to identify (characterize) the type of attack (tuple in-
sertion, deletion, and alteration attack). This column can
have values: Yes(the technique is able to characterize the
attack), and No(the technique is not able to characterize
the attack).
4.1.1.2 BPBBRT with specific watermark informa-
tion: In [61], Zhang et al. used the database content
characteristics for watermarking relational databases. In
this technique, a tuple is selected for watermarking
based on a random number between 0 and 1. A function
InterString(Abi,K, S) is used to extract a substring
from Abi (binary equivalent of the selected numeric
attribute for watermarking), where K is a secret key, S
is the length of substring. The mark bit is embedded at
the end of the binary value of attribute A2. In water-
mark detection phase, InterString is again computed
and the mark bit is matched with the last bit of A2;
if the mark bit is correctly detected, a match count is
updated. If this match count is greater than a certain
threshold, the watermark is successfully detected. The
decoding accuracy of this scheme suffers if an attacker
by launching alteration attacks alters the attribute value
and as a consequence its binary representation.
Qin et al. [62] used the idea of chaotic random num-
bers for embedding watermarks in relational database
to overcome the shortcomings of [2]. Authors generate
these numbers by using logistic equation and process
only the integral part of these numbers. The logistic
chaos equation (LCE) used is Xn+1 = µxn(1−xn); where,
µ[1, 4] and n is the number of tuples in the database.
In [63], Guo et al. converted a meaningful watermark
to a bit string. The authors then locate the candidate
attributes and candidate bits. The database is partitioned
into variable but similar sized groups. The ith bit of the
watermark is embedded into tuples of ith group.
The authors have also proposed a recovery algorithm,
if watermark is located in the data. For this purpose,
the detected bits for the subsets subset 0 (zero bits) and
subset 1 (one bits) are counted and the bit having larger
total count is supposed to be actual embedded bit.
In [64], a technique addressing additive attacks on the
watermarked relational databases has been proposed. In
the watermark insertion phase of this technique, a real
valued attribute is converted into its binary equivalent
and a bit is extracted from the integral part of a real
valued attribute (A). This bit is then embedded as the
watermark into fractional part of the same attribute if
(len(int(A))) > (pos1+) and len(frac(A)) < cap, where,
pos1 is the LSB of the integer part at position 1,  is
a parameter used to control the amount of distortion
introduced by bit embedding and cap is the number
of bits allocated for fraction part of the number. In the
watermark decoding stage, the value of the fractional
part is stored by locating the watermark bit in the
fractional part and replacing it by the oldBit which
was marked in the watermark embedding phase. The
secondary watermark attacks are handled by computing
the watermarks of each party (claiming the ownership
of the data) and a party pi is considered as the legitimate
owner of a data xi if and only if their watermark is
detected in xi. This technique is able to provide a good
solution to an important problem of additive attacks but
is not very resilient to other attacks.
Other such techniques are presented in [65], [66], [26],
and [67] but for brevity, we omit their details because
they apply small modifications to the techniques dis-
cussed above.
Table 2 shows the summary and comparison of well
known BPBBRTs with specific watermark information
based on different parameters depicted in Figure 2.
4.1.2 Image based bit-resetting techniques
Yong et al. in [68] presented a image based watermarking
technique to verify ownership on relational databases.
First a subset of tuples is selected for watermarking
using a secure hash function and then ordered RGB
values of the image are embedded as a watermark in
the database relation. For watermark detection, the same
hash function is applied to identify the marked tuples
and embedded pixel values are decoded. A similar ap-
proach was recently proposed in [69].
Zhou et al. [70] used BMP image as a watermark in
the database. The BMP image is first split into two parts:
the header part and the main information of the image,
i.e., data array. Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenhem (BCH) [71]
code is then generated as a watermark from the data
array of the image. Authors show the resilience of pro-
posed technique again additive-attacks. They suggest the
idea of a trusted third party (TTP) to investigate about
the actual owner of the database.
In [72], Wang et al. proposed a watermarking tech-
nique for relational data by applying Arnold transform
[73] on an image with data partitioning based watermark
embedding and decoding algorithms. This technique is
vulnerable to tuple insertion, alteration and deletion at-
tacks. Furthermore, a small bit flipping attack effects the
watermark decoding accuracy as the modulo operation
yields different results.
Hu et al. also presented an image based watermarking
algorithm for relational databases in [74]. Almost similar
work is presented by Sun et al. in [75]. They transform
the image into a bit flow which is used as a watermark.
In [76], authors use image elements to embed an image-
based watermark in the database relation. Like [72], such
techniques technique also face the same challenges of
robustness.
The technique in [42] also use image watermark for
textual attributes and numerical attributes. In [77], au-
thors use SVR along with FP-tree for reversible database
watermarking. Another such technique was proposed in
[19] where authors use image (other files such as audio
can also be used for watermarking) to create watermark
bits and then embed the same using a partitioned based
approach.
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TABLE 1
Summary and comparison of well known BPBBRTs with no specific watermark information.
Robust Techniques
Sch. MAT ASM TSM GL DMB ECM Dep. Dist. Opti. Rev.
[11] N Arbitrary SHF Bit Blind - PK, Yes No No
based Value
[2] N Arbitrary PRSG Bit Blind - PK, Yes No No
based Value
[48] C Arbitrary SHF Bit Blind Voting PK, Yes No No
based Value
[38] N Arbitrary SHF Bit Blind PRSG PK, Yes No No
based based Value
[57] N Arbitrary SHF Bit Blind Voting PK, Yes No No
based Value
Fragile Techniques
Sch. MAT ASM TSM Loc. DMB ECM Dep. Dist. Opti. Char.
[52] N SHF SHF Tuple Blind - PK, Yes No Yes
based based Value
TABLE 2
Summary and comparison of well known BPBBRTs with specific watermark information.
Robust Techniques
Sch. MAT ASM TSM GL DMB ECM Dep. Dist. Opti. Rev.
[62] N All Arbitrary Bit Blind - PK, Value Yes No No
[63] N Arbitrary SHF Bit Blind Voting PK, Value Yes No No
based
[64] N Arbitrary SHF Bit Not Blind - PK, Value Yes No No
Table 3 shows the summary of well known IBBRTs
based on certain parameters shown in Figure 2.
4.1.3 Bit-resetting fingerprinting techniques
Fingerprinting techniques in [78] embed a meaning-
ful fingerprint of the data to protect the interests of
buyer. The authors used the MAC on a secret key and
a user(buyer) identifier to compute the fingerprint of
length L with L > logN and N being the number
of buyers. Database relations generally have a primary
key attribute which may be used (along with other
required parameters for hash function) for calculating
the fingerprints. The authors also propose three different
approaches to fingerprint relations that do not have any
primary key. In their first approach(S-Scheme), the au-
thors have considered the candidates(for watermarking)
bits of a single numeric attribute as the virtual primary
key. This approach suffers from two main problems: (1)
The candidate bits may not be unique for each tuple
(duplicate problem); and (2) if the virtual primary key
is dropped by the attacker, the fingerprint information
is lost (deletion problem). In their second approach(E-
Scheme), Li et al. investigate the value of each numeric
attribute in a tuple. Next, a virtual primary key is
constructed from each attribute. This approach solves the
deletion problem but the duplicate problem still persists
in this approach. In the third approach(M-Scheme), bit
positions are dynamically selected to construct a virtual
primary key. In this approach, different attributes are se-
lected for different tuples and hence duplication problem
is resolved. Moreover, the fingerprint is not embedded in
only one attribute; therefore, dropping selected attributes
does not result in the fingerprint deletion problem.
In [79], Li et al. have selected tuples for fingerprinting
using a hash function. The mark embedding and detec-
tion scheme is same as proposed in [70].
Liu et al. [80] used blocks of bits that were available
for marking to embed for fingerprint.
In [81] and [82], the idea of query optimization for
fingerprinting relational databases subject to meeting
usability constraints was proposed. The authors use
declarative language to define usability constraints for
watermarking and fingerprinting relational databases.
They optimize the watermark embedding by search-
ing for specific patterns such as aggregates and join
computations. The idea of using query optimization
for fingerprinting is interesting but the dependency of
fingerprint decoding on the usability constraints may
lead to incorrect fingerprint detection after an attack.
Fingerprinting techniques proposed by Guo et al. in
[83] embed fingerprints in the database at two levels. At
the first level, the data is partitioned into m partitions
and m length fingerprint is embedded in the data by
embedding ith fingerprint bit in the selected tuples of ith
partition. At the second level, the fingerprint is extracted
from the fingerprinted tuples and a confidence level is
assigned to the extracted fingerprint. This fingerprint is
used as a secret key for the second level. The tuples
already fingerprinted are not selected for fingerprint
embedding at this level to avoid conflict between the
fingerprint embedding at both levels.
In [84], proposed a fingerprinting technique to identify
a malicious traitor, who is redistributing digital con-
tent. When a user access the database a fingerprinting
process is invoked. A manager module performs the
fingerprinting task and a parameter manager module is
used to store the fingerprinting parameters. Authenticity
of users is verified by the manager module; if the user
is unauthentic, the fingerprinting process is executed.
The encoding and decoding algorithm is the same as
proposed in [63].
Table 4 shows the comparison and summary of well
known BRFTs based on different parameters shown in
Figure 2.
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TABLE 3
Summary of well known IBBRTs.
Robust Techniques
Sch. MAT ASM TSM GL DMB ECM Dep. Dist. Opti. Rev.
[70] N Arbitrary SHF Bit Semi Blind Voting PK, Value Yes No No
based
[19] N Arbitrary SHF Bit Blind Voting Value Yes Yes No
based
TABLE 4
Comparison and summary of well known BRFTs.
Robust Techniques
Sch. MAT ASM TSM GL DMB ECM Dep. Dist. Opti. Rev.
[78] N PRSG PRSG Bit Blind Voting PK, Value Yes No No
based based
[79] N PRSG PRSG Bit Blind Voting PK, Value Yes No No
based based
[80] N All All Bit Yes - PK, Value Yes No No
[83] N Arbitrary SHF Bit Blind - PK, Value Yes No No
based
[84] N Arbitrary SHF Bit Blind - PK, Value Yes No No
based
[82] N Arbitrary PRSG Bit Blind Voting PK, Value Yes No No
based
4.2 Data statistics-modifying techniques
We further classify such techniques into two categories:
• Bit pattern based data statistics-modifying tech-
niques(BPBDSMT): In such techniques, a bit pattern
is used as a watermark and these bits are embedded
into data statistics.
• Image based data statistics-modifying
techniques(IBDSMT): Image is used for watermark
embedding in data statistics in such techniques.
4.2.1 Bit pattern based data statistics-modifying tech-
niques
4.2.1.1 BPBDSMT with no specific watermark in-
formation: The watermarking technique in [24] uses
special marker tuples to virtually partition the data into
maximal number of subsets. The number of partitions
should be equal to number of subsets. One watermark
bit is embedding into each subset subject to usabil-
ity constraints. If the number of subsets are greater
than the number of bits in the watermark, an error
correction mechanism (e.g., majority voting) is used
to make the watermarking technique resilient to the
malicious attacks. The marker tuples are used in the
watermark decoding stage for data partitioning and
successful decoding of the watermark. Two arbitrarily
chosen thresholds are used to decode the watermark
bits. This technique has two important shortcomings: (1)
use of marker tuples for data partitioning makes the
technique vulnerable to synchronization errors during
watermark decoding because the tuples deletion and
insertion attacks on the position of these tuples will
change the boundaries of the partitions and hence the
embedded bit in those partitions would not be correctly
detected; and (2) storing marker tuples for their use in
decoding stage makes this technique not-blind. More-
over, the thresholds, used for decoding an embedded bit,
are chosen arbitrarily that also result in decoding errors.
Another such technique as presented by Sebe´ et al. in
[85] for numerical datasets while preserving the mean
and variance of the watermarked attribute.
In [86], the database is first partitioned into m non-
overlapping logical groups. In this technique, bit encod-
ing was modeled as an optimization problem and then
optimization algorithms were used to optimize one-bit
watermark embedding subject to usability constraints
specified by the data owner. Authors used a thresh-
old based approach and a majority voting scheme to
decode the watermark. This scheme is robust against
tuple deletion, alteration and insertion attacks but it does
not specify how to select attribute for watermarking.
Deshpande et al. also proposed a similar watermarking
technique in [87], that is a combination of [24] and [86].
Huang et al. [88] presented a cluster based watermark-
ing algorithm for relational databases. During the em-
bedding phase, the data is first clustered into k clusters
using k-means clustering algorithm [89]. Such techniques
are suspectable to alteration attacks if an attribute value
is modified by the attacker to an extent where the cluster
of a attribute is changed.
Kamran and Farooq coined the idea of information-
preserving watermarking in [90]. This technique is fo-
cused on watermarking of relational databases contain-
ing patient records ( such databases are also termed
as electronic health records (EHR) or electronic medi-
cal records (EMR)). Authors first identify the numeric
attributes for watermarking using information gain as
a measure. Then they select attributes with low in-
formation gain for watermarking such that change in
their values does not have any impact on the diagnosis
prediction by the data mining algorithms. Authors also
specify equations for calculating the bounds for changes
in the numeric features. The change is then optimized
and embedded in the selected attributes in every row
of the EMR subject to usability constraints. Watermark
decoding also utilizes the knowledge of information gain
of the attributes. A watermark decoder is used to decode
watermark bits from each row of the marked attributes.
12
A majority voting scheme is applied to combat decoding
errors. Another interesting feature of this technique is
that it does not require any secret key for watermark
embedding or decoding yet this scheme is resilient to
tuple insertion, deletion and alteration attacks because
watermark is embedded in each row of the table.
For minimizing (or controlling) data distortions, Kam-
ran et al. in [18] limit the to-be-watermarked tuples by
suing a threshold and even hash values; while for high
robustness is achieved through once-for-all usability con-
straints. Similarly, In [14], Saman et al. extended the
work of [90] to come up with a reversible technique
while considering mutual information MI instead of
information gain IG for attribute selection. Other such
techniques are presented in [21] and [17] where au-
thors consider the histogram modulation (in [21]) and
semantic properties (in [17]) of numeric attributes during
watermark embedding to control the data distortions.
Table 5 shows the comparison and summary of well
known BPBDSMTs with no specific watermark informa-
tion based on different parameters shown in Figure 2.
4.2.1.2 BPBDSMT with specific watermark infor-
mation: In [91], Zhang et al. proposed a watermark-
ing scheme using cloud models. They form the cloud
model using different parameter and later watermark the
database using these parameters. In the detection phase,
a backward cloud generation algorithm is used to extract
the embedded watermark. Finally, a cloud algorithm is
used for matching clouds of watermark embedding and
decoding. The watermark decoding is not blind because
the original database is required during the decoding
phase.
In [92], Zhang et al. proposed a histogram expan-
sion based reversible watermarking scheme for relational
databases. For watermark embedding, authors use the
histogram expansion techniques employing overhead
information. The overhead information is used to distin-
guish the original digits and the watermarked digits. Au-
thors use the Haar wavelet transform for watermarked
database attribute identification. For embedded decod-
ing, the inverse of watermarking process is applied. Such
techniques need to keep a track of overhead information.
Fu et al. [93] used spread spectrum for selecting
database tuples for watermarking. A function W (t, k) is
also used to yield the watermark signal W = +1,−1
by using direct sequence spread spectrum and then
this signal is embedded in the data as watermark. In
the watermark decoding phase, tuples are grouped, at-
tributes are sorted and watermark is detected using even
parity check. Finally, majority voting scheme is applied
to eventually decode the watermark bits. This technique
is vulnerable to alteration attacks that may alter the
values of marked attributes.
In [94] a discrete wavelet transform (DWT) [95] based
watermarking technique for relational databases was
proposed. A data X is watermarked as CW = C +
αφ(β)Ω, where C is the original carrier, CW is the
carrier after watermark embedding, Ω is the watermark
template sequence, α is the intensive factor and L is the
length of watermark string. Ω is generated, by a secret
key, as a pseudo random sequence. This scheme suffers
form lack of robustness as embedding of watermark
in only high frequency coefficients make it easy for
the attacker to target one particular group of tuples to
corrupt the watermark.
Table 6 shows the comparison and summary of well
known BPBDSMTs with specific watermark information
based on different parameters shown in Figure 2.
4.2.2 Image based data statistics-modifying techniques
In [96], Zhang et al. first divided into logical groups.
Each group has its size equal to the size of an image. The
pixel values (v0, v1, v2, ....., vm) are embedded into the
logical groups of the data. A pixel value vi is embedded
in such a way that if vi = 255, the attribute value modulo
3 is set to 1 and if vi = 0, the attribute value modulo
3 is set to 2; otherwise, the pixel value is added to
the attribute value. In the watermark detection phase,
the attribute value modulo 3 is computed. If it returns
1 then vi = 255 is detected and if vi = 0 then 2 is
detected; otherwise, a pixel value vi is calculated by
subtracting the integer part of the attribute value Ai from
an overall attribute value Ai. The result is multiplied
by 255 yielding the value of vi, and hence watermark is
decoded. If the attribute value is changed by an attacker,
the watermark decoding accuracy is degraded.
In [97] Tsai et al. also use image for fragile watermark-
ing of database using support vector regression (SVR).
The purpose of such techniques is to detect malicious
database tampering.
In [98] Odeh and Al-Haj proposed a watermarking
scheme for relational databases using an image. In wa-
termark embedding phase, an image is converted to
bit strings, bits are grouped with each group having
size of 5 bits. The bits are then converted to a decimal
number. A time attribute is selected for watermark em-
bedding. For this purpose, seconds portion of the time
attribute is marked. In watermarking detection phase,
the marked tuples are identified by using secret key,
and the appended decimal number is extracted from
seconds part of time attribute. The number is converted
to bits, and bits are grouped in a group of 5 bits. Image is
again constructed using these bits. For experiments, the
authors have created their own database with multiple
time attributes but in practice most databases usually do
not have a great number of such attributes.
In [99], an image is first converted into a stream of
watermark bits consisting of 0’s, and 1’s. The watermark
is embedded in the fractional part of the numeric at-
tribute. A hash function is applied to select the tuples
for watermarking. For a user ID, a database DBname,
with version version, the secret key K is computed using
the relation: K = H(ID||DBname||version|...). Authors
assume two intensities for each pixel, the original inten-
sity and the predicted intensity and use their difference
to encode watermark.
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TABLE 5
Comparison and summary of well known BPBDSMTs with no specific watermark information.
Robust Techniques
Sch. MAT ASM TSM GL DMB ECM Dep. Dist. Opti. Rev.
[24] N Arbitrary SHF Value Semi Blind Voting PK, Yes No No
based Markers
[85] N Arbitrary Arbitrary Value Semi Blind - Value Yes No No
[86] N Arbitrary All Value Blind Voting PK Yes Yes No
[90] N IG All Value Semi Blind Voting IG Yes Yes No
[18] N Arbitrary SHF Value Blind Voting Value Yes No No
[21] N Arbitrary SHF Value Blind Voting Value Yes No Yes
[14] N MI All Value Semi Blind Voting MI Yes Yes Yes
[17] N Arbitrary SHF Value Blind - Value Yes No No
TABLE 6
Comparison and summary of well known BPBDSMTs with specific watermark information.
Robust Techniques
Sch. MAT ASM TSM GL DMB ECM Dep. Dist. Opti. Rev.
[91] N Arbitrary Arbitrary Value Not - PK Yes No No
Blind
[92] N Arbitrary Arbitrary Value Blind - PK, Value Yes No Yes
[93] N Arbitrary SHF Value Blind EPC, Voting PK Yes No No
based
[67] N SHF SHF Value Blind Voting PK, Value Yes No No
based based
Table 7 shows the comparison and summary of well
known IBDSMTs based on different parameters shown
in Figure 2.
4.3 Constrained Data Content-Modifying
Techniques
We further classify such techniques into two categories:
• Tuple based constrained data content-modifying
techniques(TBCDCMT): Such techniques modify
database contents modification at the tuple level.
• Attribute based constrained data content-modifying
techniques(ABCDCMT): Such techniques involve
modification of database content at an attribute
level.
• An image based constrained data content-modifying
techniques(IBCDCMT): Image is used, for water-
mark embedding in such techniques.
4.3.1 Tuple based constrained data content-modifying
techniques
4.3.1.1 TBCDCMT with no specific watermark in-
formation: Gross-Amblard [100] proposed a query-
preserving watermarking of XML documents and rela-
tional databases. For database watermarking, the author
used Gaifman graph4 while preserving the database local
queries. These queries are expressed in plain SQL for
database operations like adding grouping and aggregate
functions. The database tuples are marked in such a way
that the query result remains unaltered. Such techniques,
however, are vulnerable to tuple insertion, deletion and
alteration attacks because the values of the marked tuple
may be disturbed by these attacks.
Li et al. [102] proposed a watermarking scheme for
detecting alterations in the database relation containing
categorical data based on the tuples order. For increasing
4. “A Gaifman graph is the graph in which nodes are the variables
of the problem and an edge joins a pair of variables if the two variables
occur together in a constraint” [101].
the watermark embedding capacity in such algorithms,
authors suggest to use Myrvold and Ruskeys linear
permutation unranking algorithm [103] for exchanging
the position of tuples for distortion free watermarking
[104]. Such schemes are aimed at watermark fragility;
therefore, they can not be used for ownership protection.
Another distortion-free Fragile Watermarking technique
in [34] works for categorical data. A similar technique
is proposed in [105] and it uses tuple pairs for frag-
ile distortion-free watermarking. Other such techniques
have been presented in [106] and [107].
Kamel [108] proposed the idea of using R-tree for wa-
termarking relational databases to protect the integrity of
databases. In this technique R-tree is used to represent
entries in the relation as minimum bounding rectangle
(MBR). In the watermark encoding phase, a one-to-
one mapping function between all permutations of the
entries and the numeric value of watermark is per-
formed. A factorial number system is used to convert the
decimal value of watermark to factorial form. Watermark
embedding starts by sorting the entries in an R-tree node
on the basis of a reference order Ek. The sorting order
may be on the basis of: (1) x value at the MBR; (2) the
area of MBR; and (3) the perimeter of MBR. A circular-
left-shift operation is applied on the selected entries of
R-tree for mark encoding. The integrity of databases
is checked by verifying the order of MBR coordinates
(reference orders). If an attack aims at modifying this
order, the watermark decoding accuracy is affected. In
[109], Kamel et al. used the idea of a sensitive attribute
for tuple ordering.
Hamadou et al. proposed a zero-watermarking tech-
nique in [36] to counter additive watermarking attacks.
The technique is named zero-watermarking because wa-
termark is not actually inserted in the database instead
its information is registered with the certification author-
ity (CA). Another technique to counter additive attack
is presented in [110].
Table 8 shows the comparison and summary of well
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TABLE 7
Comparison and summary of well known IBDSMTs.
Robust Techniques
Sch. MAT ASM TSM GL DMB ECM Dep. Dist. Opti. Rev.
[96] N Arbitrary All Value Blind - PK Yes No No
[99] N SHF SHF Value Blind Voting PK Yes No No
based based
known TBCDCMTs with no specific watermark informa-
tion based on different parameters shown in Figure 2.
4.3.1.2 TBCDCMT with specific watermark infor-
mation: A publicly verifiable watermarking scheme was
proposed by Li et. al in [111]. This technique works for
watermarking attributes with any data type including
numeric, strings or boolean. The watermark key is a public
key that is generated by applying one-way hash func-
tions on personal information (e.g., owner’s identity) of
the author and the database information (e.g., database
name and version). The watermark W is generated using
this secret key. The watermark is also a database relation
and has the same number of attributes and tuples as in
the original database relation R. The number of water-
mark bits are decided by using a watermark generation
parameter. A pseudo random sequence generator is used
for watermark embedding. This scheme can detect any
modifications made to MSBs but changes made in other
bits cannot be detected using this technique.
Bhattacharya et al. [112] proposed a modified version
of watermarking technique presented in [111] by using a
private secret key instead of a public key. The technique
performs the data partitioning and extracts a binary
watermark as an image for proving the data ownership.
Other such techniques are presented in [113], and
[114] but they are slight modifications of the techniques
discussed above.
Table 9 shows the summary and comparison of well
known TBCDCMTs with specific watermark information
based on different parameters shown in Figure 2.
4.3.2 Attribute based constrained data content-
modifying techniques
4.3.2.1 ABCDCMT with no specific watermark in-
formation: In [115] Halder et al. introduced the notion of
persistent watermarking of relational databases. For this
purpose, this technique identifies two type of features
from the database: (1) Stable cells are the database cells
that are not affected by any set of queries Q (Select,
Insert, Update, and Delete) at all; and (2) Semantic prop-
erties. The stable part and semantic properties are wa-
termarked separately. In watermark embedding phase,
database is first partitioned into m non-overlapping
partitions. The watermark is converted into a bit string
of length m. The stable part and semantic properties
are watermarked such that the usability constraints are
satisfied. In the watermark decoding phase, data par-
titioning is performed and embedded bits are detected
from semantic properties and the stable cell. Only the
tuples having same primary keys in watermarked and
suspected databases are used for watermark detection.
In [116] Halder et al. extend their work by embedding
both the private and the public watermark. The purpose
of private watermarking is proving the ownership of the
data and the public key is used to check the authenticity
of data without worrying for revealing secret parame-
ters.
In [117] a query preserving watermarking was been
proposed. This technique selects alphanumeric attributes
for watermarking and alters the case of the attribute
value such that the results of a query are preserved.
A secret key is used to select tuple and alphanumeric
attribute for watermark embedding. The letters of se-
lected attribute values are changed to a sentence case if a
watermark bit is 0; otherwise, it the value is converted to
title case. The watermark detection is the inverse process
of watermark embedding. This technique is not resilient
against tuple alteration attacks because the attacker can
change the case of the attribute values without degrad-
ing the data quality.
In [20], a distortion-free watermarking technique has
been proposed that works on all type of attributes and
also considers the importance of attributes for differ-
ent application domains. The watermark encoding and
decoding is based on secret ordering for non-numeric
attributes while for numeric-feature the technique of [90]
is extended by using a secret threshold for the informa-
tion gain IG of the attributes. Other such techniques are
presented in [118], [119], and [114] but for brevity (and
to adhere to the page limit of the Journal), they are not
discussed here.
Table 10 shows the comparison and summary of well
known ABCDCMTs with no specific watermark infor-
mation based on different parameters shown in Figure
2.
4.3.2.2 ABCDCMT with specific watermark infor-
mation: The techniques like [120], [121] are based on
addition of a new column in the database relation. The
values in the new column are calculated by aggregating
the numeric columns present in a database relation. The
authors suggest to lock this column using a secret key
to ensure watermark security. But they do not clearly
highlight the locking mechanism. The major drawback
of such techniques is that the watermark information is
lost by dropping only one attribute from the database
relation without loss of data usability.
Bedi et al. [122] proposed a watermarking approach
for non-numeric data. They first generate a secret key
from eigen values of tuple-Relation matrix for a tuple.
A low impact attribute (e.g., address) is selected for
watermark embedding. In another technique, Bedi et al.
[123] use abbreviations of the words for watermarking.
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TABLE 8
Comparison and summary of well known TBCDCMTs with no specific watermark information.
Robust Techniques
Sch. MAT ASM TSM GL DMB ECM Dep. Dist. Opti. Rev.
Fragile Techniques
Sch. MAT ASM TSM Loc. DMB ECM Dep. Dist. Opti. Char.
[102] C Arbitrary SHF Tuple Blind - PK, Order No No No
based
[108] All Index Index - Blind - Reference No No No
based based order
TABLE 9
Summary and comparison of well known TBCDCMTs with specific watermark information.
Robust Techniques
Sch. MAT ASM TSM GL DMB ECM Dep. Dist. Opti. Rev.
[111] All All All Table Blind - PK, Value No No No
[112] All All All Table Blind - PK, Value No No No
Similarly, in [124], vowels are used to embed the wa-
termark. Such techniques are vulnerable to alteration
attacks and even benign updates (changing of values
of marked attributes) might result in watermark loss
without significantly degrading the data quality.
Another such technique for medical data is proposed
in [125]. This technique is based on shifting of attributes
based on the histogram constructed from the tuple val-
ues. This technique works with categorical attributes and
is aimed to ensure data integrity.
The technique in [23] uses numeric attributes to gener-
ate and verify a distortion-free fragile watermark for de-
tecting and characterizing the malicious modifications in
the database relations. For numerical attibutes, authors
use digit frequency, length and range of data values for
watermark generation and verification. This technique
is also able to characterize the malicious attacks (or
modifications).
Table 11 summarizes the well known ABCDCMTs.
4.3.3 Image based constrained data content-modifying
techniques
In [126], a table T with attributes (P,A1, A2, ....., Aj) is
watermarked to detect tampering with the database. A
watermark WM of length N is computed from an image.
An image SD is also generated from the certification
verification code to use it for watermark detection. For
the certification code verification, watermark detection
process starts by computing certification codes by ap-
plying public key on the image SD. All features are
combined to yield a vector C ′. Finally, an XOR operation
is applied on C ′ and certification code to compute the
watermark WM ′. If it matches with embedded water-
mark then database integrity is proved otherwise it is
tampered.
In [35], Al-Haj et al. proposed a watermarking scheme
for non-numeric databases based on insertion of a
double-space in multi-word attribute. This technique is
not resilient to alteration attack because an attacker can
easily remove double spaces from the database without
affecting the data usability. Moreover, benign updates
also corrupt the embedded watermark for such tech-
niques.
In [127], database is first partitioned and a pseudo
random sequence generator is used to select an attribute
for watermarking. This technique does not reset any bit
of the original data instead it uses m most significant bits
(MSBs) and n LSBs of the selected field to generate the
watermark for that field such that m + n = 8. The wa-
termark for a particular partition is converted to a gray
scale image, so the value of each cell ranges between 0
and 255. The watermark does not bring any distortion
in the database. In the watermark detection process,
the database is again partitioned and the watermark is
generated using the same procedure as in watermark
embedding. The watermark bits are matched. If the
match count is equal to ω (with ω = rows × columns),
the watermark is successfully decoded. A zero-distortion
authentication watermarking [128] is used for authenti-
cating the table without any distortions. This technique
is only useful for proving integrity of data.
Table 12 shows the comparison and summary of well
known IBCDCMTs based on different parameters shown
in Figure 2.
5 APPLICATIONS, COMPARISON AND FUTURE
DIRECTION FOR DIFFERENT TECHNIQUES
In this section, we compare the three classes – BRT,
DSMT, and CDCMT – of techniques using two con-
texts: (1) robustness against malicious attacks; and (2)
data usability (again there parameters were short-listed
from different parameters listed in Figure 2). In the
first context, we report the resilience of the watermark-
ing/fingerprinting techniques against malicious attacks
that have been discussed in section 1. In the data usabil-
ity context, we report methods of ensuring data quality
(used in the watermarking/fingerprinting techniques)
and depict scenarios where usability is a serious concern.
The robustness of each type of techniques is depicted in
Table 13. In this table R1, R2, R3, R4, and R5 denote the
robustness of watermarking techniques against A1, A2,
A3, A4, and A5 attacks respectively.
As depicted in table 13, the DSMT techniques are
relatively better against most type of attacks. ut attacks
of type A4 and A5 still expose vulnerabilities of these
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TABLE 10
Comparison and summary of well known ABCDCMTs with no specific watermark information.
Robust Techniques
Sch. MAT ASM TSM GL DMB ECM Dep. Dist. Opti. Rev.
[20] All IG All Value Blind Voting IG No Yes No
Fragile Techniques
Sch. MAT ASM TSM Loc. DMB ECM Dep. Dist. Opti. Char.
[116] N Property PRSG - Blind Voting PK No No No
based
[117] AN SHF SHF - Blind - PK No No No
based based
TABLE 11
Comparison and summary of well known ABCDCMTs.
Fragile Techniques
Sch. MAT ASM TSM Loc. DMB ECM Dep. Dist. Opti. Char.
[23] N Property All - Blind - Value No No Yes
techniques. In A4 type attacks of the attacker launches
a combination of the A1, A2, A3 attacks. Kamran and
Farooq address this attack in [90] but most of other
techniques do not consider these type of attacks in
their robustness study. However, most of the techniques do
not consider these type of attacks in their robustness study;
therefore, next generation watermarking techniques should
incorporate mechanisms that counter A4 attacks.
In A5 type attack, Mallory claims false ownership of
the data by inserting his watermark into Alice’s wa-
termarked data. The techniques presented in [70], [39],
[110], [36], [129], [64] provide mechanisms to counter
such attacks, but these techniques require the role of
third party with assumptions like: (1) an attacker will not
change the name of the attributes in a database relation;
(2) an attacker would not want to disturb the Alice’s
watermark to combat data errors; and (3) the additive
watermark will significantly degrade the data quality; as
a consequence, Alice does not need to claim the owner-
ship of this type of compromised data. It is important to
emphasize that Mallory can surpass these assumptions
while mantaining, for example, simply changing the
names of attributes does not affect the data quality.
Moreover, Mallory may also want to corrupt the Alice’s
watermark during A5 type attack. Additionally, data has
intrinsic value; therefore, it is not a great idea for Alice
to withheld ownership claim of the data. So, A5 type
of attacks also pose a new challenge to researchers of this
field. Such challenges are also valid for fingerprinting
techniques because they also require the watermark to
be robust.
The fragile watermarking techniques provide database
integrity and tamper proofing in various application
domains because they are sensitive to low intensity
malicious attacks. But in some situations it can favor the
attacking scenarios in which Mallory can safely claim the
ownership of databases watermarked by such techniques
by attacking a small part of the marked database. So, we
think this also pose a unique challenge to the researchers
of this field to come with fragile watermarking tech-
niques that can also provide the mechanism for owner-
ship protection for more generic applications that might
require both tamperproofing and ownership protection.
In order to emphasize the problem of defining usabil-
ity constraints, Table 14 shows the usability constraints
defining method and applicability of BRT, DSMT, and
CDCMT type of techniques. All techniques require an
owner to manually define the usability constraints and
this process is application dependent; therefore an owner
might need to define different usability constraints for
each type of intended use of the data. This method is
cumbersome because the data owner has to model a
different set of usability constraints after mutual con-
sensus with the intended user. Moreover, he will have
to watermark a given database for every type of user.
This activity might expose the watermarked rows to an
attacker because he may easily compare the rows of two
datasets and guess the watermarked rows by calculating
the difference between the corresponding rows of two
datasets. Therefore, there is a need of a model that automati-
cally defines the data usability constraints such that the data
quality is ensured and the data owner is not required to waste
his resources to come up with an agreed (after mutual con-
sensus with the intended data user) data usability constraints.
This model should ideally be application independent;
therefore, it is used for proving data ownership, tamper
proofing, and data integrity, and for other applications
of watermarking and fingerprinting. This model should
encompass the intelligence to assure the data quality of
the watermarked database for its potential use in every
type of intended application. Moreover, the significance
of a meaningful watermark (for instance, a biometric
feature like voice, image and so on) can also be tested
and emphasized.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, a comprehensive review of the database
watermarking and fingerprinting techniques, proposed
to date, has been presented. The classification of tech-
niques has been done on the basis of watermarking
technique and the orientation of the inserted watermark.
Using this nomenclature, three types of top level classes
are presented: BRT, DSMT, and CDCMT. A comparison
of these techniques – on the basis of robustness against
malicious attacks, and the method for defining usability
constraints defining method – has also been given. The
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TABLE 12
Comparison and summary of well known IBCDCMTs.
Fragile Techniques
Sch. MAT ASM TSM Loc. DMB ECM Dep. Dist. Opti. Char.
[126] All All All Tuple Blind - PK Yes No No
[127] All PRSG All - Blind - PK No No No
based
TABLE 13
Robustness of watermarking techniques against malicious attacks
Class of Techniques R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
Usually resilient except Usually resilient except Usually not resilient Usually not resilient Usually not resilient
techniques that techniques that: because small due to facts depicted apart from techniques
BRT use specific order use specific order manipulations can easily in R1, R2, and R3. that are specifically
(or position) of tuples (or position) of tuples disturb the marked bits designed for tackling
for watermark for watermark insertion. and even multi-bit attacks of type A5
insertion. watermarks can be corrupted. and they still have
limitations.
Usually resilient except Usually resilient except Usually resilient. Usually techniques Usually not resilient
techniques that techniques that that mark more tuples apart from techniques
use specific order use specific order are more robust to that are specifically
(or position) of tuples (or position) of tuples such attacks. But still designed for tackling
DSMT for watermark for watermark insertion. this type of attack attacks of type A5
insertion. needs to be studied and they still have
in depth because most of limitations.
the techniques proposed
so far do not
discuss this attack.
Usually resilient except Usually not resilient Usually not resilient Usually not resilient Usually not resilient
techniques that because deletion attack because small due to the facts depicted apart from techniques
use specific order may cause deletion of manipulations can easily in R1, R2, and R3. that are specifically
CDCMT (or position) of tuples newly inserted content disturb the marked bits designed for tackling
or tuples for if new content is inserted without degrading the attacks of type A5
watermark insertion. during watermark data usability significantly. and they still have
embedding. limitations.
DSMT techniques appear to be the best among different
available alternatives, but they do have certain limita-
tions in different contexts. We have also pointed out the
directions for future research in this and related areas.
To conclude, intelligent watermarking technique that
ensure data quality and also are efficient and effective
against malicious attacks is an important requirement.
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